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I. Introduction

When The Guardian published the initial Snowden
revelations,1 Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner’s2 reaction was
immediate. He was the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee
during the September 11 attacks and had negotiated the Patriot
Act with the Bush Administration.
I was the Congressman’s chief of staff. When Mr.
Sensenbrenner announced his intent to introduce legislation to
reverse what he saw as National Security Agency (NSA) overreach,
I was tasked with spearheading his legislative response. These
efforts led to the USA FREEDOM Act—a bill that would see
several versions as it navigated the legislative process.3
While Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) reform and
passage of the USA FREEDOM Act were ultimately political
decisions, the Snowden leaks exposed several questions previously
classified as legal in nature. This Article discusses a few of those

1. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon
Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.the
guardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order
(last
visited June 22, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See
Biography,
CONGRESSMAN
JIM
SENSENBRENNER,
http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/biography/ (last visited June 22, 2015)
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., (Jim), represents the Fifth Congressional
District of Wisconsin. The Fifth District includes parts of Milwaukee,
Dodge and Waukesha counties, and all of Washington and Jefferson
counties . . . . Shortly after the attacks of September 11, Jim introduced
the PATRIOT Act in the House as a method to help keep America safe
by enhancing the tools our law enforcement officials could use to
thwart another terrorist attack. He was proud to watch President Bush
sign the Act into law. Following revelations of the National Security
Agency’s bulk collection of data and the misinterpretation of Section
215 of the Patriot Act, Jim authored the USA FREEDOM Act—
bipartisan, bicameral, and comprehensive legislation to rein in abuse,
put an end to bulk collection, increase the transparency of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court and ensure the proper balance between
national security and privacy is struck.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See Summary: H.R.3361—USA FREEDOM Act, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3361 (last visited June
22, 2015) (showing an original version) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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questions and attempts to provide a brief overview of reform
efforts.
Part II of this Article discusses the standard of production for
tangible things under § 501 of FISA and the government’s
overbroad interpretation of that standard. Part III discusses the
doctrine of judicial ratification in the context of legislation related
to national security and argues that, in general, it should not
apply. Part IV discusses legislative responses to the Snowden leaks
and passage of the USA FREEDOM Act. Finally, Part V evaluates
how the USA FREEDOM Act ends bulk collection.
II. Relevance Under Section 215
First and foremost, the USA FREEDOM Act reformed what
Congressman Sensenbrenner believed was an overbroad
interpretation of § 501 of FISA.4
The first leaked Snowden document was an order from the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) directing Verizon
to produce, on “an ongoing daily basis,” all call detail records—
primarily who called whom and how long they talked—of every call
to or from every American, made either to, from, or within the
United States.5 Subsequent leaks confirmed that similar orders
were issued to other major carriers.6

4. See Jim Sensenbrenner, Abuse of the PATRIOT Act Must End, THE
GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/
09/abuse-patriot-act-must-end (last visited June 22, 2015) (“The administration
claims authority to sift through details of our private lives because the Patriot Act
says that it can. I disagree. I authored the Patriot Act, and this is an abuse of that
law.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. Secondary Order at 1–2, In re Application of the FBI for an Order
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc.,
No. BR 13-80 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Apr. 25, 2013),
https://epic.org/privacy/nsa/Section-215-Order-to-Verizon.pdf [hereinafter Verizon
Order].
6. See Dave Kravets, Why AT&T’s Surveillance Report Omits 80 Million
NSA Targets, WIRED (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/02/ma-bell-nontransparency/ (last visited June 22, 2015) (“A T & T this week released for the first
time in the phone company’s 140-year history a rough accounting of how often the
U.S. government secretly demands records on telephone customers.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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The court granted the order under § 501 of FISA, the so-called
business records provision.7 Prior to passage of USA FREEDOM,
§ 501 allowed the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) to obtain
tangible things when, among other requirements, there were
“reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought
[were] relevant to an authorized investigation.”8
The major legal flaws were two-fold: first, the requirement for
ongoing production was philosophically at odds with the purpose
of § 501, in that it was seeking to obtain phone records on an
ongoing prospective basis; second, the production of all records did
not square with § 501’s requirement that records be “relevant” to
an authorized investigation.9 Relevance is not a high legal
standard, but in crafting § 501, Congress had contemplated a
targeted authority that the government could use to obtain specific
data.
How could everything be relevant? And if everything was
relevant, what were the practical constraints of § 501?
There are, of course, instances when the government must—
for investigative purposes—obtain a broader set of documents than
just those that are ultimately critical to the investigation. In the
government’s words, “‘[R]elevance’ is a broad standard that
permits discovery of large volumes of data in circumstances where
doing so is necessary to identify much smaller amounts of
information within that data that directly bears on the matter
being investigated.”10

7.
8.
9.

Verizon Order, supra note 5, at 1.
50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2012).
PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE
RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT
AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT (Jan.
23, 2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records
_Program.pdf; Jennifer Stisa Granick & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Criminal
N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/opinion/
the-criminal-nsa.html (last visited June 22, 2015) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
10. ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER, BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY
METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 2 (2013),
https://info.publicintelligence.net/DoJ-NSABulkCollection.pdf
[hereinafter
WHITE PAPER].
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While this statement is overbroad,11 it does describe how the
government may need to collect a certain volume of records for
investigative purposes. Imagine, for example, that the FBI
determines an international terrorist purchased fertilizer to build
a bomb from a farm store in Lexington, Virginia. Because the FBI
does not know who the suspect is, all fertilizer sales made in
Lexington, Virginia over a reasonable time period may well be
relevant to the investigation—at least until the FBI determines
which sale was actually made to the suspect.
In this way, the relevance standard can allow for a certain
amount of bulk in a given collection. After the Snowden leaks, the
government released a White Paper detailing its legal defense of
the bulk collection of telephony metadata.12 The government
contends
that,
because
communications
metadata
is
interconnected, and because the connections between data points
can only be analyzed from a large volume of data, the entire
dataset is therefore relevant.13
In other words, for the government, all of our phone calls are
like the fertilizer sales in Lexington, Virginia. Because the entire
universe of America’s phone calls undoubtedly contains some calls
that are relevant to an authorized investigation, and because the
government does not know which calls are of interest, that entire
universe of calls is therefore relevant.
So how is the fertilizer example different from the
government’s collection of every phone call made by every
American?
First, in the fertilizer hypothetical, there are stipulated facts
that differentiate relevant fertilizer sales records from those that
are not relevant to the investigation. Section 501 expressly calls
for this by requiring, not that tangible things sought be relevant to
an authorized investigation, but that the government produce a
11. As discussed below, the statement’s underlying logic leads directly to
bulk collection. If the government can collect large amounts of data when doing
so is necessary to identify smaller amounts of data, then it can collect any broad
record set on the assumption that individual pieces will contain information of
interest.
12. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 2 (stating metadata collection was
both statutorily authorized and constitutional).
13. Id.
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“statement of facts showing” that the tangible things sought are
relevant.14 If this required statement of facts means anything, it
must require that the statement of facts differentiate the relevant
materials sought from the universe of all similar records.
In our hypothetical, the government is not simply requiring
that every retailer produce all of its sales records. It is bringing
forward facts that show it has reason to investigate fertilizer sales
from a particular geographic location. The statement of facts is
therefore separating the relevant documents from the entire
universe of similar documents.
The only alternative would be that the statement of facts
merely describes why the government needs the records. Under
this rationale, § 501 would allow the government to collect any and
all tangible things it deemed useful to an authorized investigation.
If this was Congress’s intent, it would have said as much.
With the bulk collection of telephony metadata, the
government’s statement of facts merely articulates a supposed
value in collecting data on every call. There are no facts to
differentiate calls that are more likely to relate to the government’s
investigation from every other call made by innocent Americans.
This leads to the second distinction between the fertilizer
hypothetical and bulk metadata collection—the scope of the
collection. The government’s interpretation of the section is so
broad that it ultimately conflates relevance with utility—the
records are relevant because the government believes it needs
them. This is not a standard at all.
Returning to—and distilling—the government’s description of
relevance: “‘[R]elevance’ is a broad standard that permits discovery
of large volumes of data . . . where . . . necessary to identify much
smaller amounts of information . . . .”15 While this describes our
fertilizer hypothetical, it also allows for any collection, no matter
14. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2012)
[A] statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized
investigation (other than a threat assessment) conducted in accordance
with subsection (a)(2) to obtain foreign intelligence information not
concerning a United States person or to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities . . . .
15. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 2.
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how large, that includes at least some relevant data. The
government’s interpretation actually creates a perverse incentive
to over-collect records because a larger volume of data is more
likely to include relevant material.
In its White Paper, the government does attempt to articulate
limits on what it can collect under § 501.16 The government
contends that the interconnectivity of phone metadata is what
differentiates it from other types of tangible things.17 Because one
individual’s phone metadata links to others’ phone metadata, the
information can be assembled into a singular web. Medical records,
for example, are discrete, not interlocking, and therefore, an order
for “all medical records” would not comport with the government’s
interpretation of § 501.18
The “interconnectivity” of records, however, does not
differentiate relevant records from the broader universe of
records—it simply distinguishes between different types of record
sets. An awful lot of records would comport with the government’s
rationale. Emails, texts, sales transactions—who bought what
from whom—who has visited what doctor and when, and
essentially any other record that documented any form of social
interaction could be assembled into a similar “web” and, therefore,
could meet the government’s definition of relevance.
Why interconnectivity should confer relevance is ultimately
unclear—especially given that the government is not actually
collecting a “web” of data. No such web exists. The phone
companies never link these records into a web of data to create a
single tangible thing. The government is simply collecting billions
of individual records that, by its own admission, it has no legal
basis to collect. The fact that the government eventually compiles
all of these records into a database and performs a contact chaining
process that could identify relevant records does not somehow
retroactively add relevance to the documents, which of course,
must be relevant at the time of collection.
16. See id. at 3 (noting that the Government can only collect information for
counterterrorism purposes and cannot collect content of call or personal
information).
17. Id. at 14.
18. Id.
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Thus, interconnectivity confers relevance only if you confuse
utility with relevance. None of this holds up to scrutiny under
analysis of relevance, and there is little colorable suggestion that
Congress intended to authorize this program. Neither the
government nor the FISC seriously suggests otherwise.
In ACLU v. Clapper,19 the Second Circuit agreed that the
phone records of every American are not relevant under § 501.20
The court equated § 501’s standard to a grand jury subpoena.21
While it acknowledged that the relevance standard used for a
grand jury subpoena is broad, it is not limitless, and it must be
tailored to fit a particular investigation.22 The NSA’s bulk
collection program, by contrast, had no such limits. The court
wrote, “[T]he records demanded are all-encompassing; the
government does not even suggest that all of the records sought, or
even necessarily any of them, are relevant to any specific defined
inquiry.”23 As a result, the Second Circuit ruled that the
government’s bulk collection program violated the § 501 relevance
standard.
Even though the USA FREEDOM Act amends § 501 to end
bulk collection, the relevance standard remains in place in both
§ 501 and in other legal authorities. It therefore remains important
to confront the government’s overbroad approach.
To that end, the Second Circuit’s decision in Clapper is
welcome jurisprudence. In discussing relevance, future courts
should consider an analytic framework that expressly examines
(1) whether the government’s theory of relevance differentiates the
documents needed for its investigation from the broader universe
of similar records to the greatest extent practicable, and
(2) whether the government’s theory of relevance is so broad that
it ultimately conflates relevance and utility. This allows the
government investigatory leeway without inappropriately opening
all records to government collection.
19. 785 F.3d 787 (2015).
20. See id. at 812 (“We agree with appellants that such an expansive concept
of ‘relevance’ is unprecedented and unwarranted.”).
21. See id. at 811 (“Both the language of the statue and the legislative history
support the grand jury analogy.”).
22. Id. at 812.
23. Id.
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The government seems to acknowledge that its interpretation
of relevance is at best strained.24 It therefore attempts to augment
its interpretation of § 215 by arguing that Congress reauthorized
the program after the government started its bulk collection
program. The government writes, “It is significant to the legal
analysis of the statute that Congress was on notice of this activity
and of the source of its legal authority when the statute was
reauthorized.”25 As discussed in the next section, this argument is
also without merit.
III. Judicial Ratification of Classified Decisions
The government, the FISC, and at least one federal court have
argued that, because Congress reauthorized § 501 after the FISC
approved the bulk metadata collection program under the
authority, Congress tacitly signaled its intent to enact the
Administration’s interpretation of the law.26
The Administration argued, “It is significant to the legal
analysis of the statute that Congress was on notice of this activity
and of the source of its legal authority when the state was
reauthorized.”27 The basic premise is a well-established rule of
judicial construction—known as ratification—that helps courts
determine congressional intent by assuming Congress is aware of
a public understanding of a law or phrase.28 “Congress is presumed
to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a

24. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 17.
25. Id. at 2.
26. See Verizon Order, supra note 5, at 1 (ordering production of telephone
metadata under 50 U.S.C. § 1861); WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 17–18 (“After
receiving the classified briefing papers, which were expressly designed to inform
Congress’ deliberations on reauthorization of Section 215, Congress twice
reauthorized this statutory provision, in 2010 and again in 2011.”); ACLU v.
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“And viewing all the
circumstances presented here in the national security context, this Court finds
that Congress ratified section 215 as interpreted by the Executive Branch and the
FISC, when it reauthorized FISA.”).
27. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 2.
28. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 243 (2011) (“The consistent
gloss represents the public understanding of the term.” (emphasis added)).
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statute and to adopt that interpretation when it reenacts a statute
without change.”29
This assumption is highly problematic when applied to
legislation relating to national security, however, precisely
because the judicial and administrative interpretations are not
public. It is, therefore, much more difficult to know whether
members of Congress actually know about a relevant
interpretation of a law. As a result, courts should rarely, if ever,
find that Congress ratified a classified statutory interpretation.30
The FISC first authorized the government’s bulk collection of
telephony metadata under § 501 in 2006.31 In 2010 and 2011,
Congress reauthorized § 501 without making any changes to the
text.32 In the interim, the Administration had made its
interpretation of § 501 available to Congress.33
On a semiannual basis, the executive branch must provide
reports to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
(House Intelligence Committee or HPSCI), the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (Senate Intelligence Committee or
SSCI), and the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.34 The
reports must include (1) a summary of significant legal
interpretations of § 501 involving matters before the FISC, and
(2) copies of all decisions, orders, and opinions of the FISC that
include a significant construction or interpretation of § 501.35 The
congressional reports are classified and are not made public.36
In addition to providing these classified reports to the
Judiciary and Intelligence Committees, prior to the 2010
reauthorization, the executive branch made available to Congress
“a classified, five-page document discussing the bulk telephony
metadata program.”37 That classified document, which the
29. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978).
30. The fact that classified legal interpretations are themselves problematic
is outside the scope of this Article.
31. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 1.
32. Id. at 18.
33. Id. at 17–18.
34. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
35. 50 U.S.C. § 1871 (2012).
36. Id.
37. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 744.
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government recently declassified in part, stated that “Section 501
orders generally require the production of the business
records . . . relating to substantially all the telephone calls handled
by the [telecommunication] companies, including both calls made
between the United States and a foreign country and calls made
entirely within the United States.”38
Senate Intelligence Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein sent a
letter to colleagues informing them that the Administration had
made available a classified paper on “intelligence collection made
possible by authority that is subject to the approaching sunset.”39
And House Intelligence Chairman Silvestre Reyes sent a letter
informing his colleagues that “it is important that all Members of
Congress have access to information about this program.”40
Because of these disclosures, the government has argued, and
the FISC and Judge Pauley in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York have accepted, that Congress
ratified the government’s interpretation of § 501.41 Judge Pauley
wrote, “[V]iewing all the circumstances presented here in the
national security context, this Court finds that Congress ratified
section [501] as interpreted by the Executive Branch and the FISC,
when it reauthorized FISA.”42 And writing for the FISC, Judge
Claire Eagan found that “[t]he record before this Court thus
demonstrates that the factual basis for applying the reenactment
doctrine and presuming that in 2011 Congress intended to ratify
Section 501 as applied by this Court is well supported.”43
38. Id. at 745.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 17–19 (“But to the extent there is
any question as to the program’s compliance with the statute, it is significant
that, after information concerning the telephony metadata collection program
carried out under the authority of Section 215 was made available to Members of
Congress, Congress twice reauthorized Section 215.”); Verizon Order, supra note
5, at 1 (“This Court having found that the Application of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) for an Order requiring the production of tangible things from
Verizon Business Network Services, Inc. . . . satisfies the requirements of 50
U.S.C. § 1861.”); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(“[T]his Court finds that Congress ratified section 215 as interpreted by the
Executive Branch and the FISC, when it reauthorized FISA.”).
42. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 745.
43. Amended Memorandum Opinion at 27, In re Application of the Fed.
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The concept of ratification fails, however, in highly classified
settings because it depends entirely on a presumption of
Congress’s awareness about developments in the law. In a typical
case, it is reasonable to assume that members of Congress are
aware of a statutory interpretation prior to passing legislation. 44
This presumption is simply not reasonable in the national security
context.
When information is classified, it is much more difficult for
members to gain access to it. Reviewing classified material, even
for a member of Congress, requires arranging time to travel to
secure facilities to personally review information. A majority of
members do not employ staff with sufficient clearances to review
FISC decisions and other interpretations of national security
authorities. In fact, staff in members’ personal offices in the House
of Representatives are not permitted to hold sufficiently high
clearances, so most House members are not capable of employing
cleared staff.
In a traditional area of law, there are almost countless ways
for members to learn of judicial or administrative interpretations.
There are press reports, email updates, Congressional Research
Service memos, social media posts, phone calls from constituents
and lobbyists, briefings from staff, casual conversations, and
testimony at hearings. The interpretation is public and becomes a
part of the legislative record and prep materials that members rely
on. In this context, we know that members are aware of legal
interpretations because they publicly discuss them.
The majority of these avenues are simply unavailable in the
national security context. The result is that fewer members know
about classified interpretations of statutes. How many fewer is
impossible to know, and that is the crux of the problem in
Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things From,
No. BR 13-109 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Oct. 11, 2013),
https://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/br13-09-primary-order.pdf.
44. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239–40 (2009)
(“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation
of a statue and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without
change.”); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (same); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth
LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 243 (2011) (“When ‘all (or nearly all) of the’ relevant judicial
decisions have given a term or concept a consistent judicial gloss, we presume
Congress intended the term or concept to have that meaning when it incorporated
it into a later-enacted statute.”).
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attempting to apply judicial ratification to classified
interpretations of statutes. The logic underlying ratification—that
it is reasonable to assume members knew about a judicial
interpretation—does not apply.
In the case of § 501, Congress may have been actively misled
by the Administration. Congressional oversight depends on honest
testimony. At a hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee,
Senator Ron Wyden asked Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper, “‘Does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions
or hundreds of millions of Americans?’ Clapper responded, ‘No,
sir . . . not wittingly.’”45
While both the FISC and the district court in Clapper relied in
part on ratification to uphold the government’s bulk collection
program, neither court was able to convincingly determine what
members actually knew. Judge Pauley in Clapper posed the
question regarding what members of Congress actually knew but
ultimately concluded that it was enough that “the Executive
Branch did what it was required to do under the statutory scheme
that Congress put in place to keep Congress informed about foreign
intelligence surveillance.”46 But no one accused the government of
violating its disclosure laws. Judicial ratification is a matter of
statutory interpretation, not a form of punishment for members of
Congress perceived to have exercised insufficient due diligence.
In order for ratification to apply, the question should be: is it
reasonable to assume that members of Congress were aware of a
judicial and administrative interpretation and intended to adopt
that interpretation into law? A finding that ratification does not
apply in the national security context does not equate to a finding
of wrongdoing in the executive branch. It is just an
acknowledgement that the information is more difficult to come
across and the logic underlying ratification is absent. Courts are
poorly positioned to determine the extent to which members of
Congress were aware of, and relied upon, classified information in
the legislative process. As a result, judicial ratification should
rarely, if ever, be applied to classified statutory interpretations.
45. Paul Campos, How James Clapper Will Get Away with Perjury, SALON
(June 12, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/06/12/how_james_clapper_will_get_
away_with_perjury/ (last visited June 23, 2015) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
46. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 745.
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In Clapper, the Second Circuit overturned Judge Pauley’s
ruling and rejected the government’s argument that Congress
ratified the Administration’s determination. First, the court noted
that ratification cannot overcome the plain meaning of a statute.
“Where the law is plain, subsequent reenactment does not
constitute an adoption of a previous administrative
construction.”47
The court further noted that the Supreme Court wrote in
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, “The consistent gloss represents the
public nature of the statutory interpretation is central to the
doctrine.”48 The point is to help courts determine congressional
intent. If a court does not know whether members were aware of a
classified interpretation, it cannot logically assume that they
intended to adopt it. In Clapper, the Second Circuit wrote,
But here, far from the ordinarily publicly accessible
judicial or administrative opinions that the
presumption contemplates, no FISC opinions
authorizing the program were made public prior to
2013—well
after
the
two
occasions
of
reauthorization upon which the government relies,
and despite the fact that the FISC first authorized
the program in 2006.49
Congress’s response to the Snowden leaks confirms the logic
underlying the Second Circuit’s decision. Upon learning of the
government’s interpretation of § 501, members took concrete steps
to block the changes. The nature of the debate was fundamentally
different from previous debates to reauthorize the PATRIOT Act.
Unlike previous reauthorizations, Congress openly discussed
whether to allow bulk collection.50
47. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 819 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Demarest v.
Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991)).
48. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 562 U.S. 223, 243 (2011) (“The consistent gloss
represents the public understanding of the term.” (emphasis added)).
49. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 820.
50. In a recent blog post, Professor Steven Vladeck touched upon this point:
[G]iven what we now know about the government’s
interpretation of section 215, there’d be no way to view such a
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It ultimately voted not to. Congress’s rejection of bulk
collection once the practice was public is strong evidence that it did
not intend to ratify the Administration’s classified interpretation.
It is a lesson on the hazards of judging Congressional intent based
on non-public information.
For the above reasons, courts should closely reexamine
whether ratification makes sense in the context of national
security decisions.
IV. The Procedural History of the USA FREEDOM Act
The Snowden leaks were public in June 2013.51 Members and
staff began work on the USA FREEDOM Act soon thereafter.52 In
July of that same year, Representative Justin Amash from
Michigan introduced an amendment to the annual defense
appropriation bill that would have stripped the NSA of funding for
“clean” reauthorization as anything other than congressional
ratification of that (dubious) reading of the statute—which
would leave the Fourth Amendment challenge as the only
remaining issue to be resolved by the Second, Ninth, and D.C.
Circuits (and, perhaps, the Supreme Court). In other words,
the closer we get to June 1 without meaningful discussion in
Congress about section 215 reform, the more likely it is that
we’ll get a result that’s worse than no reform–unqualified
congressional validation of the government’s deeply contested
interpretation. That’s not reform; that’s entrenchment.
Steve Vladeck, Whither the Section 215 Reauthorization Debate?, JUST SECURITY
(Mar.
19,
2015,
1:19
PM),
http://justsecurity.org/21263/section-215reauthorization-debate/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2015) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
51. See Mirren Gidda, Edward Snowden and the NSA Files-Timeline, THE
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
21,
2013,
5:54
PM),
www.theguardian.
com/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-nsa-files-timeline (last visited May 10,
2015) (providing a timeline of the disclosures by Edward Snowden) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
52. See Chris Gentilviso, Justin Amash’s NSA Surveillance Amendment
Ruled In Order, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2013, 11:34 PM),
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/22/justin-amash-nsa-surveillance_n_3637 462.
html (last updated July 23, 2013, 10:49 AM) (last visited May 10, 2015) (“A little
more than a month after secret National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance
programs were leaked to the public, one GOP congressman is making headway
with his push to defund those initiatives.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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its implementation of § 501.53 Despite heavy lobbying against the
amendment from House leadership of both parties and from the
White House, the amendment was narrowly defeated by a vote of
217 to 205.54
The Amash amendment was a blunt, rather than a nuanced,
response to the NSA overreach,55 and it was aggressively opposed
by both leadership and the White House.56 Its narrow political
defeat was thus a clear political signal that there was a strong
desire for reform in the House of Representatives.57
This
signal
was
augmented
when
Congressman
Sensenbrenner introduced the USA FREEDOM Act that fall.58 The
bill attracted 152 cosponsors,59 as well as the support of technology
companies and privacy groups.60 Importantly, twelve of the bill’s
cosponsors had voted against the Amash amendment—more than
enough to have reversed the outcome of the vote.61 In 2013, in the
wake of the Snowden leaks, a clear majority of the House of
Representatives favored reforming surveillance authorities.62
53. See Austin Wright, Justin Amash Prevails as Amendment Fails,
POLITICO (July 24, 2013, 7:27 PM), www.politico.com/story/2013/07/justin-amashnsa-amendment-94722.html (last updated July 27, 2013, 9:45 AM) (last visited
May 10, 2015) (discussing the amendment Representative Amash introduced) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
54. See id. (discussing the Amash amendment).
55. See id. (describing the Amash amendment as a “controversial measure”).
56. See id. (“The measure drew the ire of House Republican leaders and the
White House.”).
57. See id. (discussing how civil liberties advocates threatened to oppose any
attempt to quash the amendment).
58. Dan Roberts, Congressional Duo Launch NSA Overhaul Bill and Urge
‘Meaningful Reform,’ THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2013, 12:51 PM),
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/29/nsa-overhaul-bill-legislation-usafreedom-act (last visited May 10, 2015) (writing about the launch of the USA
FREEDOM Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
59. See USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013)
(introducing the USA FREEDOM Act).
60. See, e.g., Open Letter to the Senate, REFORM GOV’T SURVEILLANCE (May
19, 2015), www.reformgovernmentsurveillance.com/#111614 (last visited Aug.
20, 2015) (encouraging the Senate to pass the USA FREEDOM Act) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
61. See USA FREEDOM Act, supra note 59 (listing cosponsors of the USA
FREEDOM Act).
62. See Wright, supra note 53 (discussing how the House of Representatives
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While the depth of support was less clear in the Senate, Senator
Patrick Leahy introduced an identical Senate companion bill.63
From the beginning, the surveillance debate exposed unusual
Washington allegiances that were more about grassroots versus
leadership than traditional partisanship.64 Leadership from both
parties and the White House opposed the bill upon its
introduction,65 but it was supported by some of the most liberal and
conservative members of the House and Senate.66
Passing any legislation is difficult in the current political
climate, but it is exponentially more difficult when the law in
question is opposed by leadership.67 Members supporting the bill,
however, joined by outside privacy groups and tech companies,
were putting near-constant pressure on Congress for reform.68 In
February 2014, a group of over forty technology companies and
privacy groups organized an event titled “The Day We Fight Back”
in an effort to encourage Congress to vote on the USA FREEDOM
Act.69 Congressman Sensenbrenner alone published eight op-eds

“overwhelmingly passed a separate NSA amendment . . . [that] would ensure the
NSA [was] barred from acquiring or storing the content of emails and phone calls
of people in the United States”).
63. See USA FREEDOM Act, S. 2685, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014)
(introducing the identical Senate bill).
64. See Roberts, supra note 58 (“The measure also has more than 70
bipartisan co-sponsors in the House and enjoys the diverse support of groups
ranging from the National Rifle Association to the American Civil Liberties
Union.”).
65. See Wright, supra note 53 (discussing opposition to earlier attempts to
limit the NSA bulk-collection).
66. See Roberts, supra note 58 (listing members of both parties that
supported the bill).
67. See Philip Bump, The 113th Congress Is Historically Good at Not Passing
Bills, WASH. POST (July 9, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/thefix/wp/2014/07/09/the-113th-congress-is-historically-good-at-not-passing-bills
(last visited May 10, 2015) (discussing Congress’s inability to pass bills) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
68. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (discussing the bipartisan
support for the USA FREEDOM Act and the pressure from various groups).
69. See THE DAY WE FIGHT BACK, thedaywefightback.org (last updated Feb.
13, 2014) (last visited May 10, 2015) (calling on organizations and individuals to
take action against mass surveillance) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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to help build momentum,70 and there was a slow leak of disclosures
from the Snowden documents, keeping the need for reform in the
news.71
Senator Feinstein, the Chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, attempted to recapture the conversation by
introducing the FISA Improvements Act.72 The bill opened by
stating its intent to end bulk collection, but then listed numerous
exceptions that largely allowed the Administration to maintain the
status quo.73
Senator Feinstein easily moved the FISA Improvements Act
through her own committee, but the bill was poorly received
outside the Intelligence Committee and was widely panned by

70. See Jim Sensenbrenner, The Abuse of the PATRIOT Act Must End, THE
GUARDIAN (June 13, 2013, 7:00 PM), www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/
jun/09/abuse-patriot-act-must-end (last visited May 13, 2015) (discussing the
Congressman’s efforts to take action to curtail abuses of the Patriot Act) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jim Sensenbrenner & Senator Pat
Leahy, The Case for NSA Reform, POLITICO (Oct. 28, 2013, 9:40 PM),
www.politico.com/story/2013/10/leahy-sensenbrenner-nsa-reform-98953.html
(last updated Oct. 29, 2013, 6:42 AM) (last visited May 13, 2015) (calling for
reform of the NSA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jim
Sensenbrenner, The NSA Overreach Poses a Serious Threat to Our Economy, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2013, 8:30 AM), www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/
nov/20/jim-sensenbrenner-nsa-over reach-hurts-business (last visited May 13,
2015) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jim
Sensenbrenner, NSA Abused Trust, Must Be Reined In, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL
(Nov. 2, 2013), www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/nsa-abused-trust-must-be-reinedin-b99131601z1-230292131.html (last visited May 13, 2015) (same) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jim Sensenbrenner, How Obama Has
Abused the Patriot Act, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2013), www.latimes.com/opinion/ oped/la-oe-sensenbrenner-data-patriot-act-obama-20130819-story.html (last visited
May 13, 2015) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jim
Sensenbrenner, How Secrecy Erodes Democracy, POLITICO (July 22, 2013, 11:12
PM), www.politico.com/story/2013/07/how-secrecy-erodes-democracy-94568.html
(last visited May 13, 2015) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
71. See Gidda, supra note 51 (citing to a timeline of the Snowden
disclosures).
72. See FISA Improvements Act, S. 1631, 113th Congress (1st Sess. 2013)
(introducing the FISA Improvements Act).
73. See id. (excepting a variety of bulk collection methods from the bill’s
scope).
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editorial boards and outside groups.74 It never received a vote on
the Senate floor.75
Adding to the pressure for reform was that the business
records provision, along with two other surveillance authorities
from the PATRIOT Act—roving wiretaps and lone wolf—were set
to sunset on June 1, 2015.76 Increasingly, reform appeared to be
the only way to save these authorities, and USA FREEDOM
appeared to be the only acceptable vehicle for reform.77
Actual movement came when Chairman Mike Rogers of the
House Intelligence Committee announced his intention to move his
own FISA reform bill, The FISA Transparency and Modernization
Act.78 The bill was carefully structured, not only to maintain the
status quo with regard to current surveillance programs, but to do
so in a way that avoided triggering jurisdiction in the House
Judiciary Committee.79
With its oversight of the judiciary and federal law
enforcement, the Judiciary Committee was, historically, the
primary committee of jurisdiction for surveillance authorities.80
74. See, e.g., Nicole Ozer, Sen. Dianne Feinstein’s NSA ‘Reforms’: Bad for
Privacy, Bad for Business, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 9, 2013, 2:29 PM),
www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/sen-diannefeinsteins-nsa-reforms-bad-privacy-bad (last visited May 13, 2015) (criticizing the
FISA Improvements Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
75. See FISA Improvements Act, supra note 72 (failing to go to a vote on the
Senate floor).
76. See, e.g., Nadia Kayyal, Section 215 of the Patriot Act Expires in June. Is
Congress
Ready?,
ELEC.
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Jan.
29,
2015),
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/section-215-patriot-act-expires-june-congressready (last visited May 30, 2015) (discussing the planned sunsetting of the roving
wire taps and lone wolf provision) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
77. See id. (mentioning how the USA FREEDOM Act extended the sunset of
§ 215 by two years).
78. See The FISA Transparency and Modernization Act, H.R. 4291, 113th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2014) (“Mr. Rogers . . . introduced the following bill.”).
79. See id. (allowing for certain bulk collection programs and providing that
“[t]he Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court shall have jurisdiction to review”).
80. See Spencer Ackerman, NSA Critics Express “Deep Concern” Over Route
Change for House Reform Bill, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2014, 7:35 AM),
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/26/nsa-critics-house-reform-bill-switch
(last visited May 30, 2015) (discussing how review through the Intelligence
Committee and not the Judiciary Committee was “highly unusual”) (on file with
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The HPSCI bill, therefore, was not only a dramatic substantive
departure from USA FREEDOM, but also a significant
jurisdictional shift.81
While nuanced, the issue of committee jurisdiction is
significant.82 Different committees and different committee chairs
often have drastically different perspectives.83 The Judiciary
Committee is composed primarily of lawyers.84 Their perspective
is shaped by their legal backgrounds, as well as by their primary
focus of overseeing federal law enforcement, such as the FBI, the
Drug Enforcement Administration, and the other federal law
enforcement entities.85 Judiciary Committee members are
typically well-versed in the Constitution and constitutional rights
and view the government’s interaction with the public through the
prism of criminal law and its long history of regard for individual
rights.86
The Intelligence Committee, by contrast, has primary
jurisdiction over the Central Intelligence Agency and the NSA.87
Its perspective is similarly shaped by these relationships, their

the Washington and Lee Law Review).
81. See id. (discussing the “deep concern” about the jurisdictional shift from
the House Judiciary Committee to the Intelligence Committee).
82. See id. (discussing some of the ramifications of the jurisdictional shift).
83. See John R. Wright, Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in
the U.S. House of Representatives, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 430 (1990) (providing
an example of how the Ways and Means Committee consider themselves more
senior, generally safer electorally, and concerned with broader and more
important substantive problems than the Agricultural Committee).
84. See About the Committee, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/committee-members (last visited May 30, 2015)
(“Due to the legal nature of the committee’s work it has been customary for
members of the committee to have a legal background.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
85. See id. (listing the jurisdictional scope of the Judiciary Committee).
86. See id. (discussing the legal background and “breadth of knowledge”
committee members often have, as well as the types of matters that come before
the committee).
87. See History and Jurisdiction, H. INTELLIGENCE COMM. (last visited May
30, 2015) (discussing the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Committee) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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focus on clandestine activities, and the need to collect
intelligence.88
A jurisdictional shift from the Judiciary to the Intelligence
Committee could, therefore, have had a profound effect on the
substance of our surveillance laws.89 As a result, the Intelligence
Committee Chair’s decision to move the FISA Transparency and
Modernization Act proved to be a critical motivator to convince
House Judiciary Chairman, Bob Goodlatte, to move the USA
FREEDOM Act.90 The two committee chairs announced their
intention to markup competing FISA reform bills on the same
day.91
To avoid this conflict within the Republican Conference, thenHouse Majority Leader Eric Cantor organized a meeting with
Chairmen Rogers, Goodlatte, and Sensenbrenner and asked that
they reconcile the differences between their dramatically different
bills.92 Because a substantial majority of the House of
Representatives favored reform, the USA FREEDOM Act became

88. See id. (discussing the oversight of the Intelligence Committee).
89. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of
changing the jurisdiction to the Intelligence Committee from the Judiciary
Committee).
90. See, e.g., Dustin Volz, House to Advance Bill to End Mass NSA
Surveillance, NAT’L J. (May 5, 2014), www.nationaljournal.com/tech/house-toadvance-bill-to-end-mass-nsa-surveillance-20140505 (last visited May 30, 2015)
(discussing how the decision to hold a mark-up of the USA FREEDOM Act may
have been “a counter to plans the House Intelligence Committee ha[d] to push
forward a competing bill”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
91. See id. (“[J]ust hours after the Freedom Act earned a markup date, the
Intelligence Committee announced it, too, would move forward with a markup of
its own NSA bill—the FISA Transparency and Modernization Act.”).
92. See generally Spencer Ackerman, USA Freedom Act Unanimously Clears
House Judiciary Committee, THE GUARDIAN (May 7, 2014, 5:14 PM),
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/07/usa-freedom-act-clears-housecommittee-nsa-surveillance (last visited May 30, 2015) (discussing how the
Intelligence Committee was also going to mark up the USA FREEDOM Act) (on
file at Washington and Lee Law Review); Lisa Mascaro, White House’s Late
Changes to NSA Spying Bill Shake Support, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2014, 7:28 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/la-na-nsa-reforms-legislation-20140522story.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2015) (discussing how “officials argued in the
closed discussions” in House Majority Leader Eric Cantor’s office and also
discussing the changes to the USA FREEDOM Act) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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the basis for negotiations between the House Judiciary and
Intelligence Committees.93
Prior to action, the two committees worked closely with the
Administration and House leadership to review and negotiate the
original bill.94 The result was a significant narrowing of the text,
though it still maintained its core functions of (1) ending bulk
collection across all surveillance authorities, (2) increasing
transparency and oversight of surveillance authority, and
(3) reforming the FISC.95
The negotiated bill passed the Judiciary Committee
unanimously on May 7, 2014.96 The Intelligence Committee passed
the identical text by voice vote.97
The period between committee and floor consideration led to
another difficult round of negotiations with the Administration
and House leadership.98 Much of the difficulty stemmed from
drafting technicalities, rather than substantive disagreements. On
the one hand, proponents of reform believed that the government’s
expansive reading of relevance99 necessitated a narrowly drafted
ban on bulk collection.100 The Administration, however, argued for
broader construction because it worried that narrow language
93. See Ackerman, supra note 92 (discussing the support for the USA
FREEDOM Act).
94. See id. (discussing the new version of the USA FREEDOM Act).
95. See USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014)
(presenting an edited version of the USA FREEDOM Act to the Senate). For a
more detailed discussion of the USA FREEDOM Act, see infra Part V.
96. See Ackerman, supra note 92 (reporting the unanimous passing of the
USA FREEDOM Act in the Judiciary Committee).
97. See Josh Gerstein & Alex Byers, House Intel Surprises on NSA
Surveillance, POLITICO (May 8, 2014, 2:29 PM), www.politico.com/blogs/underthe-radar/2014/05/house-intel-surprises-on-nsa-surveillance-188205.html (last
visited May 30, 2015) (discussing how the House Intelligence Committee passed
the USA Freedom Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
98. See Julian Hattern & Christina Marcos, House Votes 303-121 to Curb
NSA, THE HILL (May 22, 2014, 11:08 AM), thehill.com/policy/techynology/206929house-votes-to-limit-nsa-spying (last visited May 30, 2015) (discussing the
opposition the bill faced) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
99. See supra Part II (discussing the arguments surrounding the “relevance”
wording).
100. Press Release, Rep. Zoe Lofgren., Rep. Zoe Lofgren Floor Statement on
Opposing the USA FREEDOM Act (May 22, 2014) (on file with the author).
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could be misinterpreted by the FISC to limit unintended
collection.101
The result was compromise legislation that neither side
thought perfect.102 Importantly, the bill for the first time received
the unqualified support of the White House. The White House
endorsed the bill in an official policy statement that read:
The bill ensures our intelligence and law enforcement
professionals have the authorities they need to protect the
Nation, while further ensuring that individuals’ privacy is
appropriately protected when these authorities are employed.
Among other provisions, the bill prohibits bulk collection
through the use of Section 215, FISA pen registers, and
National Security Letters.103

Unfortunately, however, the bill lost the support of many of the
key privacy groups and technology companies.104 The primary
objection was that the bill too narrowly defined the limiting term
used to ban bulk collection.105 Thus, while the USA FREEDOM Act
easily passed the House of Representatives, it lost the support of
some of its strongest congressional patrons.106

101. See David Kravets, NSA Reform Falters as House Passes Gutted USA
Freedom Act, ARSTECHNICA (May 22, 2014, 1:12 PM), arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2014/05/nsa-reform-falters-as-house-passes-gutted-usa-freedom-act (last
visited May 30, 2015) (discussing how the Obama administration pressured
Republicans to water down the USA FREEDOM Act) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
102. See id. (providing views from different representatives about the watered
down bill).
103. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT
OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY (2014).
104. See Andrea Peterson, NSA Reform Bill Passes House Despite Loss of Civil
Rights Groups, WASH. POST (May 22, 2014), www.washington post.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2014/05/22/nsa-reform-bill-passes-house-despite-loss-of-support-fromprivacy-advocates/ (last visited May 30, 2015) (“But privacy advocates, technology
companies and lawmakers warned that the version of the bill passed by the House
was watered down to the point where they could no longer support it.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
105. See id. (discussing how the initial version of the bill included a more
narrow definition).
106. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 230, OFFICE OF THE CLERK (May 22, 2014),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2014/roll230.xml (last visited August 4, 2015) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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In his statement on the House floor, Congressman
Sensenbrenner conceded that the compromise legislation fell short
in some respects, but nonetheless argued for the bill’s support:
Let me be clear, I wish this bill did more. To my colleagues who
lament changes, I agree with you. To privacy groups who are
upset about lost provisions, I share your disappointment. The
negotiations for this bill were intense, and we had to make
compromises, but this bill still deserves support. Don’t let the
perfect be the enemy of the good. Today, we have the
opportunity to make a powerful statement: Congress does not
support bulk collection.107

On May 22, 2014, the House of Representatives passed this version
of the USA Freedom Act, with 303 votes in favor and 121
opposed.108 Upon House passage, Senator Leahy put out the
following statement:
Today’s action in the House continues the bipartisan effort to
restore Americans’ civil liberties. But I was disappointed that
the legislation passed today does not include some of the
meaningful reforms contained in the original USA FREEDOM
Act. I will continue to push for these important reforms when
the Senate Judiciary Committee considers the USA FREEDOM
Act next month.109

Because so many privacy advocates and technology companies
pulled their support for the House-passed version of the USA
FREEDOM Act, Senator Leahy had the opportunity to reopen
negotiations with the now-supportive Administration.110 Senator
107. Press Release, Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Statement on the House
Floor in Support of H.R. 3361 the USA FREEDOM Act (May 22, 2014) (on file
with the author).
108. See Hattern & Marcos, supra note 98 (discussing the margin in which
the House passed the USA FREEDOM Act).
109. Press Release, Sen. Pat Leahy, Comment of Senator Patrick Leahy (DVt.), Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, on House Passage of the USA
FREEDOM Act (May 22, 2014) (on file with the author).
110. See Tom Risen, Patrick Leahy Introduces Privacy Boosted USA
FREEDOM Act, U.S. NEWS (July 29, 2014, 12:07 PM), www.usnews.com/news/
articles/2014/07/29/patrick-leahy-introduces-privacy-boosted-usa-freedom-act
(last visited May 30, 2015) (“Leahy has been negotiating with the Obama
administration and other members of the Senate and the intelligence community
on changes to the legislation since a compromise version of the legislation passed
the House.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Leahy succeeded in updating the House-passed legislation
rebuilding the bill’s original coalition of privacy groups
technology companies, while maintaining support from
Administration.111 Importantly, General James Clapper
Attorney General Eric Holder endorsed the bill, writing:

and
and
the
and

The Intelligence Community believes that [the USA FREEDOM
Act] preserves essential intelligence community capabilities;
and the Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence support your bill and believe that it is a
reasonable compromise that enhances privacy and civil liberties
and increases transparency.112

Despite this coalition, the bill ultimately failed to meet the
sixty-vote threshold for cloture in the Senate.113 The USA
FREEDOM Act thus died in the 113th Congress, despite support
from 303 members of the House of Representatives and fifty-eight
Senators.114
The Senate vote could have been the end of reform efforts.115
Because, however, three surveillance provisions from the
PATRIOT Act would sunset on June 1, 2015, there was a continued
need to address privacy concerns stemming from government
surveillance.116 In early 2015, members began bipartisan,
111. See Kaylyn Groves, Coalitions Support Leahy’s USA FREEDOM Bill for
Surveillance Reform, ASS’N RESEARCH LIBRARIES (July 29, 2014),
www.arl.org/news/arl-news/3332-coalition-supports-leahys-usea=freedom-billfor-progress-toward-transparency-in-surveillance#.VWobvaPD9QU
(last
updated July 31, 2014) (last visited May 30, 2015) (discussing the groups that
supported Leahy’s version of the USA FREEDOM Act) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
112. Letter from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., and James Clapper, Dir.
Nat’l Intelligence, to Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman Sen. Judiciary Comm. (Sept.
2, 2014), http://fas.org/irp/news/2014/09/ag-dni-usaf.pdf.
113. See 160 CONG. REC. S6,075–03 (daily ed. Nov. 18. 2014) (roll call for
Senator Leahy’s USA FREEDOM Act garnering only fifty-eight yeas).
114. See supra notes 98, 113 and accompanying text (discussing the House
and Senate votes on the USA FREEDOM Act).
115. See Adi Robertson & Nathan Ingraham, USA Freedom Act for NSA
Reform Is Voted Down in the Senate, THE VERGE (Nov. 18, 2014, 8:29 PM),
www.theverge.com/2014/11/18/7241967/usa-freedom-act-for-nsa-reform-is-voteddown-in-the-senate (last visited May 30, 2015) (“[N]ew legislation around this
program will still be required despite the Senate’s vote.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
116. See id. (discussing the scheduled sunset of Section 215).
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bicameral discussions to reconcile the House-passed version of the
USA FREEDOM Act with the updated version introduced by
Senator Leahy.117
On April 28, 2015, Congressmen Sensenbrenner, Goodlatte,
Conyers, and Nadler reintroduced the USA FREEDOM Act.118 The
members had first reconciled the differences between the House
and Senate versions of the bill with Senators Lee and Leahy, then
with Chairman Devin Nunes, the new Chair of HPSCI, and finally
with House leadership. Despite strong support in the House,
Senate leadership had still not indicated support for the bill.
On May 13, the House of Representatives again passed the
USA FREEDOM Act. The vote in 2015 was 338 in favor and eightyeight opposed.119 The overwhelming support was an important
statement for the Senate.
With the sunset for the PATRIOT Act’s surveillance
authorities on the horizon, the Senate nonetheless dug in against
the USA FREEDOM Act. Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, along
with Senate Intelligence Chair Saxby Chambliss and Senate
Judiciary Chair Chuck Grassley, pushed for a clean
reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act authorities—an extension of
the existing authorities without any reforms.120 Meanwhile,
Senator Rand Paul drew a hard line on the other side and
advocated for a complete sunset of the authorities.
These tensions came to a head when Majority Leader
McConnell brought the USA FREEDOM Act to the Senate floor on
117. See Spencer Ackerman, NSA Reform Bill Imperiled as It Competes with
Alternative Effort in the Senate, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 28, 2015, 9:03 PM),
www.theguardian.com/us-news-2015/apr/28/house-nsa-reform-bill-senate-usafreedom-act (last visited May 30, 2015) (discussing the 2015 USA FREEDOM Act
version that was the product of ten weeks of “closed-door” negotiations in
Congress) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
118. H.R. 2048—USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2048/actions (last visited
Aug. 4, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
119. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 224, OFFICE OF THE CLERK (May 13, 2015),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2015/roll224.xml (last visited Aug. 4, 2015) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
120. Kim Zetter, Senate Fails to End NSA Bulk Spying, Votes Against USA
FREEDOM Act, WIRED (May 23, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/05/senatefails-end-nsa-bulk-spying-votes-usa-freedom-act/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2015) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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May 22—just over a week before expiration of the PATRIOT Act
authorities. Heavy lobbying from Senate hawks led to a narrow
defeat on a procedural vote with fifty-seven Senators voting to
proceed to debate on the USA FREEDOM Act, three votes short of
the sixty-vote threshold for cloture.121
Senator McConnell attempted to pass a two-month
reauthorization of the expiring authorities. The Senate, however,
easily defeated his proposal. Senator McConnell then proposed a
one-week extension, but Senator Paul objected, thereby blocking
the vote.122 McConnell suggested an extension until June 5, but
Senator Wyden objected.123 Then McConnell tried for June 3, only
to have Senator Heinrich object.124 Finally, the Majority Leader
asked for an extension through June 2, but Senator Paul objected
to even this twenty-four-hour extension of the expiring
authorities.125
Exasperated, Majority Leader McConnell announced that the
Senate would reconvene from its recess on May 31, just hours
before expiration of the surveillance authorities. Late that night,
the Senate voted 77–17 to proceed to consideration of USA
FREEDOM.126 Senator McConnell filed several amendments
designed to weaken the civil liberties protections of the bill.127
121. Dustin Volz, Brendan Sasso, Sarah Mimms & Rachel Roubein, How the
Senate Fell Apart and Failed to Deal with the PATRIOT Act, NAT’L J. (May 22,
2015), http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/NSA-Patriot-Act-Rand-Paul-20150522
(last visited Aug. 20, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Julian Hattem, PATRIOT ACT Expires as Paul Blocks Final Vote on
NSA Reform, THE HILL (May 31, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/nationalsecurity/243575-patriot-act-expires-as-paul-blocks-final-vote-on-NSA-reform.
(last visited Aug. 20, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
127. See Robyn Greene, Senators Should Oppose Senator McConnell’s
Amendments and Pass a Clean Version of the USA FREEDOM Act, OPEN TECH.
INST. (June 1, 2015), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/senators-should-opposesenator-mcconnells-amendments-and-pass-a-clean-version-of-the-usa-freedom-act/
(last visited Aug. 4, 2015) (describing Senator McConnell’s amendments to the
USA FREEDOM Act; while McConnell initially offered more amendments, only
three were ultimately brought to a vote) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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Senate rules, however, would not allow a vote on final passage
of the bill or the amendments until Tuesday, June 2. As a result,
three surveillance authorities from the USA PATRIOT Act
temporarily sunset at 12:00 AM on June 1, 2015.
Any amendments to the House-passed bill would have, at the
least, delayed reauthorization of the authorities, as the House of
Representatives would have had to vote on the Senate-amended
bill. There was also no guarantee that the House would accept the
Senate’s changes. As a result, Senator McConnell was bucked by
his own party as the Senate voted down each of his amendments
by a simple majority vote. The Senate then passed the identical
language as the House, 67–32, enacting the USA FREEDOM Act
into law.128
V. The USA FREEDOM Act’s Ban on Bulk Collection
The USA FREEDOM Act was always intended to end bulk
collection, but the way the bill met this goal evolved during the
legislative process.129
Upon introduction, the USA FREEDOM Act sought to end
bulk collection by crafting new standards of collection across
government surveillance authorities.130 When, however, the House
Judiciary and Intelligence Committees scheduled the bill for
markup, the FBI privately worried that the new standard could
have unintended consequences for individual collection.131
To address this concern, members settled on a different
approach whereby the standard for individual collection was left
intact, but USA FREEDOM added a new requirement that the
128. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 114th Congress – 1st Session, SENATE.GOV
(June 2, 2015), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_
vote_cfm.cfm?congress=114&session=1&vote=00201 (last visited Aug. 4, 2015)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
129. See FISA Improvements Act, S. 1631, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013)
(discussing the core function of the USA FREEDOM Act); supra Part IV
(discussing the evolution of the USA FREEDOM Act).
130. See USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013)
(limiting the manner in which the government could collect data).
131. See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text (discussing the allowances
§ 215 gives to the FBI).
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government include a “specific selection term” as the basis for
production under (1) § 501, (2) for orders for a pen register trap
and trace device, and (3) for various national security letter (NSL)
authorities.132
Section 501 of FISA
USA FREEDOM expands the § 501 surveillance authority
with a specific new mechanism for the collection of call detail
records.133 The mechanism grew out of a proposal that President
Obama proposed in January, 2014. The President announced
reforms to the collection of signals intelligence by the federal
government and issued Presidential Policy Directive (PPD). For
collection of business records other than call detail records, the
USA FREEDOM Act requires the government to use a specific
selection term as the basis for production.
In January, 2014 the Administration released Presidential
Policy Directive (PPD 28), which defined bulk collection as the
acquisition “of large quantities of signals intelligence data which . .
. is acquired without the use of discriminants (e.g., specific
identifiers, selection terms, etc.).”134 By requiring a specific
selection term, the USA FREEDOM Act therefore, by definition,
ended bulk collection.135 But would this new limitation be
sufficient in practice?
132. USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361 § 103 (as reported by the House
Judiciary Committee).
133. “Call detail records” include “session identifying information (including
originating or terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber
Identity number, or International Mobile Station Equipment Identity number), a
telephone calling card number, or the time or duration of a call.” USA FREEDOM
Act, § 107, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 107, 129 Stat. 268 (2015).
134. Presidential Policy Directive—Signals Intelligence, PPD-28, OFF. OF THE
PRESS
SECRETARY
(Jan.
17,
2014),
www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities (last
visited June 14, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
135. The definition of SST was easily the most heavily debated portion of the
bill. See 160 CONG. REC. H4793,4801 (daily ed. May 22, 2014) (debating the
definition of “specific selection term”). The definition saw several versions from
the House-passed bill, to the Senate-introduced bill, to its reintroduction in the
114th Congress. See id. (discussing the different versions of the term while
debating its meaning). The intent of the specific selection term and its role in
ending bulk collection, however, remained constant across these bills. See infra
note 141 (discussing the meaning of the term). The next portion of this Article
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While virtually every line of the Act’s text was subject to
scrutiny and negotiation, there was no aspect of the bill that
garnered more intense focus than the definition of specific selection
term. It was primarily this definition that led many technology
companies and privacy groups to pull their support for the USA
FREEDOM Act after it first passed the House in 2014.136 It was
only after Senator Leahy redrafted the definition that these
organizations again supported the bill.
In drafting the statute, it became clear that bulk collection—
at least the bulk collection most members objected to—was less
about the exact quantity of tangible things sought than the
indiscriminate nature of the collection.137 As discussed in Part II,
this was the critical distinction between the government’s
metadata collection program and our fertilizer hypothetical.138 The
metadata collection program is considered “bulk,” while the
fertilizer hypothetical is not because the collection of fertilizer
sales is no broader than necessary for the purpose of the
investigation.139
The relevance standard should have required a statement of
facts that separated the necessary documents or tangible things
from the broader universe of similar tangible things, but the
government interpreted the standard to obviate this analysis and
ultimately conflate relevance and utility—the government
believed it should have access to any data that could serve a useful
investigatory purpose.
As enacted, the USA FREEDOM Act defines a specific
selection term as:

discusses the SST in terms of this general intent, rather than the specifics of the
different definitions.
136. H.L. Pohlman, The NSA FREEDOM Act?, WASH. POST (May 27, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/27/the-nsafreedom-act/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
137. See 160 CONG. REC. H4800 (daily ed. May 22, 2014) (statement of Rep.
Dutch Ruppersberger) (discussing how bulk collection means the “indiscriminate
acquisition of information”).
138. See supra Part II (discussing the distinctions between metadata
collection and the hypothetical presented).
139. See 160 CONG. REC. H4793–4801 (daily ed. May 22, 2014) (statement of
Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger) (discussing metadata collection).
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(i) IN GENERAL - Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a
‘specific selection term’—
(I) is a term that specifically identifies a person, account,
address, or personal device, or any other specific
identifier; and
(II) is used to limit, to the greatest extent reasonably
practicable, the scope of tangible things sought consistent
with the purpose for seeking the tangible things.
(ii) LIMITATION.—A specific selection term under clause (i)
does not include an identifier that does not limit, to the greatest
extent reasonably practicable, the scope of tangible things
sought consistent with the purpose for seeking the tangible
things, such as an identifier that—
(I) identifies an electronic communication service provider
(as that term is defined in section 701) or a provider of
remote computing service (as that term is defined in
section 2711 of title 18, United States Code), when not
used as part of a specific identifier as described in clause
(i), unless the provider is itself a subject of an authorized
investigation for which the specific selection term is used
as the basis for the production; or
(II) identifies a broad geographic region, including the
United States, a city, a county, a State, a zip code, or an
area code, when not used as part of a specific identifier as
described in clause (i).140

The complexity of the definition reflects the intensity of
negotiations over the term. A lot of the analysis of the definition
focused on the initial clause and the limitation. The fact that a
specific selection term cannot be used to identify an “electronic
service provider” or a “broad geographic area” is an important
restriction, but the key to the new legal standard is that the
specific selection term must be “used to limit, to the greatest extent
reasonably practicable, the volume of tangible things sought
consistent with the purpose for seeking the tangible things.”141 The
SST is, therefore, not intended to put a cap on the total amount of
140. USA FREEDOM Act, § 107, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 107(k)(4)(A)(i)–(ii), 129
Stat. 268 (2015).
141. Id. § (k)(4)(A)(i)(II). This is the definition used in the most recent version
of the USA FREEDOM Act, but the goal was consistent throughout beginning
with the House-passed version of the USA FREEDOM Act and extended into the
Senator Leahy’s new Senate version. See 161 CONG. REC. S2772 (daily ed. May
12, 2015) (statement of Sen. Mike Lee) (discussing the meaning of “specific
selection term” and why the term was included in the bill).
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records, but instead, to limit the number of records to the greatest
extent possible.142
As discussed in Part II, this limitation should have been
considered an essential aspect of the relevance standard.143
Because it was not, the USA FREEDOM Act explicitly codified the
limitation. The standard requires a case-by-case, fact-specific
determination by the FISC as to whether the government’s request
is limited to the “greatest extent reasonably practicable.”144
USA FREEDOM also expands the Section 501 surveillance
authority with a specific new mechanism for the collection of
call detail records.145 The mechanism grew out of a policy that
President Obama proposed in January, 2014. The President
announced reforms to the collection of signals intelligence by
the federal government and issued PPD 28.146 He directed that
the FISC would first approve queries of telephone metadata
collected by the NSA under Section 501 of FISA and that such
queries would be limited to two “hops.”147

USA FREEDOM relies on these reforms and establishes a
new, narrowly-tailored mechanism for the targeted collection of
telephone metadata. It is narrower than the bulk program the
government operated prior to PPD 28, but broader than what
would otherwise be allowed under § 501 as amended by the USA
FREEDOM Act.
If the government can demonstrate a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that a specific selection term148 is associated with a
142. See id. (discussing why Congress added the term to the USA FREEDOM
Act).
143. See id. (discussing the problems with the relevance standard).
144. See USA FREEDOM Act, § 107(k)(4)(A)(i)(II) (codifying the specific
selection term as a limitation to bulk collection).
145. See supra note 133 (defining call detail records).
146. Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence (Jan. 17,
2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17
/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence.
147. Id.
148. For the purposes of the call detail records program, a specific selection
term is defined as “a term that specifically identifies an individual, account, or
personal device.” USA FREEDOM Act, § 107, Pub. L. No. 114-23. As discussed
later in this section, the Act uses a different definition of specific selection term
for the production of all other tangible things.
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foreign power or an agent of a foreign power engaged in
international terrorism, the FISC may issue an order for the
ongoing, daily production of call detail records held by telephone
companies. The FISC may order the production of up to two
“hops”—i.e., the call detail records associated with the initial
telephone number and the records associated with the records
returned in the initial hop.149
This new authority—designed to allow the government to
search telephone metadata for possible connections to
international terrorism—does not preclude the government’s use
of standard business records orders under Section 501 to compel
the production of business records, including call detail records,
but the collection would not be prospective and the government
likely could not collect “two hops” from the targeted individual.
VI. The USA FREEDOM Act’s Ban on Bulk Collection Across
Other Authorities
Section 201 of the Act prohibits bulk collection under the pen
register and trap and trace device authority by requiring that each
application include a specific selection term as the basis for the use
of the device.
The definition of “specific selection term” is similar to the
definition of that term for § 501 orders. Specifically, it is a term
that specifically identifies a person, account, address, or personal
device, or any other specific identifier, that is used to limit, to the
greatest extent reasonably practicable, the scope of information
sought, consistent with the purpose for the use of a pen register or
trap and trace device. It does not include terms that are not so
limited, such as terms based on a broad geographic region or
service provider.
Finally, § 501 of the USA FREEDOM Act prohibits the use of
various NSL authorities (contained in the Electronic
149. A second “hop” does not include an individual listed in a telephone
contact list, or on a personal device that uses the same wireless router as the seed,
or that has similar calling patterns as the seed. Nor does it exist merely because
a personal device has been in the proximity of another personal device. These
types of information are not maintained by telecommunications carriers in the
normal course of business and, regardless, are prohibited under the definition of
“call detail records.”
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Communications Privacy Act, Right to Financial Privacy Act, and
Fair Credit Reporting Act) without the use of a specific selection
term as the basis for the NSL request. It specifies that for each
NSL authority, the government must specifically identify the
target or account.
VII. Conclusion
Negotiating FISA reform, I sometimes imagined my
intelligence-minded colleagues looking with bewilderment at those
of us across the table who were working to end bulk collection. Why
exactly should we care?
It is a fair question. It would be a clean line if we believed that
our records were somehow inviolable—that our records are our
own and our right to keep them from the government is absolute,
absent some suspicion of wrongdoing. But virtually all proponents
of reform concede that this standard would be too restrictive for
records not protected by the Fourth Amendment.150 The
government does, in some instances, need to collect “large volumes
of data” to identify “smaller amounts of information” that bear on
an investigation.151
So if the government can collect the records of innocent
persons for investigative purposes in some circumstances, why can
it not in others?
Ultimately, the limits are a check on government power.152
Just as we are naïve to ignore the very real threats to our national
security, we would be equally naïve to ignore the very real
encroachments our government has made on civil liberties at
150. See Casey J. Mcgowan, Note, The Relevance of Relevance: Section 215 of
the USA Patriot Act and the NSA Medatata Collection Program, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2399, 2439 (2014) (discussing middle ground where the NSA is not
completely prevented from collecting data outside of the Fourth Amendment).
151. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 2.
152. See Dan Froomkin, USA Freedom Act: Small Step for Post-Snowden
Reform, Giant Leap for Congress, THE INTERCEPT (June 2, 2015),
firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/06/02/one-small-step-toward-post-snowdensurveillance-reform-one-giant-step-congress/ (last visited June 14, 2015)
(discussing the limits the USA FREEDOM Act puts on the government’s ability
to bulk collect) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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perilous times in our country’s history. Under the government’s
definition of relevance, the government can indiscriminately
collect and store data when it believes the datasets are potentially
valuable.153 Once the FISC accepts this construct, the line becomes
the government’s to draw.
Limits on government power matter. Maybe more
importantly, where those limits are drawn should be a political
question. If the government is to conduct bulk collection—and the
courts ultimately deem it constitutional—it should be a democratic
choice made by elected officials accountable to the voters.
The USA FREEDOM Act represents a clear political product,
drafted as an honest attempt to equip the intelligence community
with the tools it needs without unnecessarily compromising
privacy or civil liberties. There is no perfect place to draw the line
between privacy and national security. The Constitution does,
however, establish that the political process is the perfect way to
draw it.

153. See id. (discussing how the government can still access metadata it
deems to be relevant).

